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THE WAR ON TERROR AND IRAQ IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE©
BY ANTONY ANGHIE*
This article critically examines the doctrine of
pre-emption articulated in the National Security Strategy
and the arguments made in favour of the proposition
that it represents an emerging norm of international law
and is compatible with the UN Charter. It focuses in
particular on the possible implications with the UN
Charter. It focuses in particular on the possible
implications of this doctrine for Third-World states. It
also examines the war in Iraq and pre-emption may be
seen as replicating, in certain respects, a much earlier
colonial history.
Cet article critique la doctrine de la guerre
pr6ventive qui fiut 6labor6e dans le cadre de la Strat~gie
am6ricaine de s6curit6 nationale, ainsi que les arguments
qui d6fendent la proposition selon laquelle cette doctrine
repr6sente une norme naissante du droit international,
et qu'elle est compatible avec la Charte de 'ONU. En
particulier, il s'intdresse aux implications possibles envers
la Charte de 'ONU, ainsi qu'aux implications possibles
de cette doctrine pour les Etats du Tiers-monde. De
plus, il analyse la guerre en Irak; la pr6vention peut &re
vue comme une rdplique, sous certains angles, d'une
histoire coloniale bien ant6rieure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The War on Terror inaugurated by the Bush administration has
profoundly challenged the system of international law and relations created
by the United Nations (UN). The concept of pre-emptive self-defence,
articulated by President George W. Bush in his 2002 National Security
Strategy,' is a central component of this war. The National Security Strategy
generated an ongoing controversy that has not only preoccupied
international lawyers, but has further extended into various other areas of
scholarship, including the realm of political theory; the doctrine of pre-
emption has inevitably challenged existing understandings of the ethics of
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self-defence and "just war" theory, for example.2 The basic elements of pre-
emptive self-defence have also been reiterated and elaborated upon in the
2004 U.S. Presidential Debates.
Pre-emption, however, while it most directly and immediately
questions the law relating to the use of force, has far wider ramifications
because, as the National Security Strategy makes clear, it is but one aspect
of a broader policy that also involves transforming "rogue states" into
democratic polities. The ongoing war in Iraq, then, provides us with an
example of this aspect of the policy in action.
This article examines some of the legal arguments that surround the
legitimacy of the doctrine of pre-emption. While many critics of pre-
emption have asserted that it is illegal, others have suggested that pre-
emption is permitted by existing international law-an international law
that is suitably adapted to take into account the contemporary realities of
terrorism. The argument that pre-emption is necessary or desirable or legal
is largely based on the view that the challenges and dangers that confront
the international community are unprecedented, and require a new system
of international order and a revision of existing international law. This
article studies the doctrine of pre-emption from a historical perspective or,
more particularly, a perspective suggested by an examination of the
relationship between international law and imperialism. I take the war in
Iraq to be an example of what the pre-emption doctrine involves, and what
consequences might follow from its implementation. My basic argument is
that pre-emption, as articulated and acted upon by the Bush doctrine and
the example of Iraq, resurrects a very old set of ideas that were articulated
at the beginning of the modern discipline of international law. The re-
emergence of these themes disturbingly illuminates the imperial dimensions
of international law, and the enduring impact of imperialism in the
international system.
II. PRE-EMPTIVE SELF-DEFENCE
The basic elements of pre-emption were articulated by President
Bush in the National Security Strategy:
For centuries international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they
can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger
of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often condition the legitimacy of
preemption on the existence of an imminent threat-most often a visible mobilization of
armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent
threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.
2 See e.g. "Symposium: War and Self-Defense" (2004) Ethics & Int'l Aff. 63.
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The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by its adversaries, the State will, if necessary, act pre-
emptively.
The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should
nations use preemption as a pretext of aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of
civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United
States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.
3
This argument regarding pre-emption appears to be contrary to the
restrictions imposed on the use of force by article 2(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations, which reads in part that "Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an
armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations."4 Self-
defence is premised on the previous occurrence of an "armed attack." It is
this fundamental premise of the system of the UN Charter that is being
challenged by what might be termed the "Bush doctrine." Despite this,
various arguments have been made to the effect that the Bush doctrine is
consistent with the law of the UN Charter and with international law more
generally or, at the very least, that the UN Charter should be read in such a
manner to permit the doctrine.' William H. Taft IV, the Legal Adviser to
the Department of State, has offered a more restrained version of pre-
emption doctrine which focuses on the concept of an "imminent threat":
"after the exhaustion of peaceful remedies and a careful, deliberate
consideration of the consequences, in the face of overwhelming evidence
of an imminent threat, a nation may take preemptive action to defend its
nationals from unimaginable harm."6
Pre-emptive self-defence, or anticipatory self-defence, to use a term
3 Supra note 1 at part V.
4 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, art. 51 [UN Charter].
5 See e.g. Elizabeth Zoller, "The Law Applicable to the Pre-emption Doctrine" (2004) 98 Am. Soc.
Int'l Rev. 333; Abraham D. Sofaer, "On the Necessity of Pre-emption" 14 E.J.I.L. 209 [Sofaer]. For
arguments against pre-emption, see e.g. Mary Ellen O'Connell, "The Myth of Pre-emptive Self-
Defence" American Society of International Law Task Force on Terrorism, online: American Society
of International Law < http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf>; Michael Bothe, "Terrorism and the
Legality of Pre-emptive Self-defence" (2003) 14 E.J.I.L. 227.
6 William H. Taft IV, "The Legal Basis for Preemption" (18 November 2002), online: Council on
Foreign Relations <http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5250>.
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that is more common in the earlier literature on this perennial subject,7 has
always posed a difficult problem to both "just war" theory and to
international lawyers. As Richard Tuck argues, the doctrine of pre-emption
is "clearly a morally fraught matter, as by definition the aggressor has not
been harmed, and his judgment about the necessity of his action might well
be called into question both by the victim and the neutral observer.",
8
Nevertheless, international lawyers have argued that this form of self-
defence should be permitted as a state cannot wait until it is actually
attacked before taking action.9 Consequently, the famous words of Daniel
Webster have been invoked to argue that pre-emptive self-defence is
permissible in the narrow circumstance where there is a "necessity of self-
defence instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment
of deliberation."' 10
It is clear that the Bush doctrine expands the right to anticipatory
self-defence well beyond the circumstances identified in Caroline. President
Bush, by asserting that "[t]he United States will not use force in all cases to
preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a pretext
for aggression,"" raises the very difficult question of how pre-emption is to
be distinguished from aggression."2 Further, equally significantly, the
statement makes it clear, if only by implication, that not only imminent
threats, but emerging threats may be a justifiable reason to resort to pre-
emption. Both the UN Charter and Caroline, as they have been traditionally
understood, cannot support the Bush doctrine.
Arguments asserting that the Bush doctrine is consistent with
international law rely, then, on the view that both the UN Charter and
Caroline should be interpreted in a manner consistent with contemporary
realities-"the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries," terrorists
and rogue regimes that seek to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
These arguments are problematic for several reasons. Who is to decide that
this is the authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter? Many states,
7 See e.g. Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force, State Action Against Threats andArmedAttacks (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 97-109; Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of
Force (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 111-15 [International Law].
8 The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order From Grotius to Kant
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) [Rights of War and Peace].
9 For a discussion of these authorities, see International Law, supra note 7 at 86.
10 The Caroline Case (1837), 29 Brit. & For. St. Papers 1137 [Caroline].
11 National Security Strategy, supra note 1.
12 See e.g. Definition ofAggression Resolution, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), UNGAOR, 1974, Supp. No.
31, UN Doc. A/9631. art. 2 states in part that "The first use of armed force by a State in contravention
of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression ......
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including many non-aligned states, have resisted the policies articulated in
the National Security Strategy, and, indeed, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
himself has asserted that the doctrine of pre-emption "represents a
fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly,
world peace and stability have rested for the last 58 years."' 3 These
responses scarcely support the view that pre-emption has become a part of
the accepted system of international law.
Despite this, a number of arguments have been made to the effect
that the Bush doctrine simply represents current realities, and if the UN
failed to recognize these realities, it would simply lapse into irrelevance-if
it has not already done so. 14 What are the consequences that might follow
if indeed pre-emption did become a part of international law? What is the
scope of the doctrine, and in what circumstances does it come into
operation? What effect will the instantiation of pre-emption within the
framework of international law have on some of the most fundamental
tenets of international law?
All sovereign states are equal. Given that self-defence is arguably
the central and most fundamental right of the sovereign, it would follow
that the right of pre-emptive self-defence will be enjoyed by all states. Such
a doctrine would surely contribute to enormous instability, given the various
tensions that exist between states. Equally, it might be argued that if the
right to pre-emptive self-defence is a part of existing international law, then
both North Korea and Iran have a legal right to attack the United States.
After all, both of those states were included with Iraq in the notorious
"Axis of Evil" identified by President Bush. Given the ongoing tensions
between the United States and Iran, and the fact that the first member of
that axis, Iraq, has already been attacked, it would seem perfectly
permissible for Iran to argue that it is justified in attacking pre-emptively.
But the very invocation of this example suggests that even though self-
defence is the most basic of sovereign rights, pre-emptive self-defence is a
right that the United States intends to be confined only to itself and its
allies. How then, is an ostensibly universal right to be confined only to a
selected number of states, and on what basis is that selection to be made?
One approach is for the U.S. to accept that the right of pre-emption
13 Press Release SG/SM/8891 "Address to the General Assembly" (23 September 2003), online:
United Nations <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sgsm 8891.doc.htm>.
14 See e.g. Michael Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed" 82 Foreign Aff. 16 (May/June
2003). But see David M. Malone, "The Effective Role of the UN Security Council in International Law:
Diminishing Returns?" in Canadian Council on International Law, ed., Reconciling Law, Justice and
Politics in the International Arena: Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Canadian Council
of International Law, Ottawa, October 16-18 2003 (Ottawa: Canadian Council on International Law,
2004) 1.
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is indeed universal, knowing full well that no rational state would dare to
openly and directly even attempt to attack it as the global superpower.
Within this framework, the idea of sovereign equality that continues to
compel the imagination of the international community may be preserved
in a formal sense only, because the realities of international relations will
ensure that powerful states-those that have the capacity to inflict massive
destruction on any opponent, through the use of nuclear weapons if
necessary-enjoy a special status even within an ostensibly egalitarian
system."5 If, then, pre-emption does somehow become an accepted part of
international law as a result of the Bush doctrine, then the international
order will come to somewhat resemble the system that existed among
European states in the late nineteenth century.
Under the positivist law of the nineteenth century, it was completely
legal for states to go to war, as doing so was the ultimate prerogative of the
sovereign. Some semblance of order was preserved among European states
during this period, despite this lack of legal constraint, because of the
existence of a balance of power. 16 The use of force becomes legally
permissible in an expanded range of circumstances, but states do not resort
to force because of deterrence and because of the uncertain consequences
that would follow. It is discouraging to note, however, that the balance of
power system not only failed to prevent, but indeed, may have contributed
to the conflagration of the Great War. In addition, the danger that has
prompted contemporary action is not so much a direct attack by a state, but
by a terrorist organization, and a balance among states may not have any
limiting effect on a non-state actor.
17
But another aspect of the late nineteenth-century parallel suggests
a further line of argument that is being advanced in a more general way,
and that may be applied to the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence. This
argument asserts that the world may be divided into law abiding states and
"rogue states," pre-modern and postmodern states, non-democratic and
democratic states, and that only members belonging to the former
categories of these dichotomies are proper members of the international
15 For an illuminating analysis of the doctrine of sovereign equality and the United States, see
Nico Krisch, "More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and US predominance in international law"
in Michael Byers & Georg Nolte, eds., United States Hegemony and the Foundations of lntemational Law
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 135.
16 See Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (New York:
Anchor Books, 2003) at 550ff; Alexander George, Force and Statecraft (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
17See Eyal Benvenisti, "The US and the Use of Force: Double-Edged Hegemony and the
Management of Global Emergencies" (2004) 15 E.J.I.L. 677 at 688.
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community and can therefore exercise certain fundamental
rights-including, presumably, a right to pre-emptive self-defence.
The lineage of this sort of argument may be traced back at least to
the work of Immanuel Kant, whose idea of world peace is based on a
distinction between liberal and non-liberal states.18 The basic idea is that
international law provides a very weak system of law and enforcement, and
the most effective constraints on a state's exercise of power derives from its
internal political order. The liberal-democratic state, with all the systems
of accountability that it institutionalizes, provides an effective check on
government, and will ensure that governments do not resort to war without
proper deliberation and a just cause. In non-civilized, non-democratic
states, however, no such constraint exists, and authoritarian rulers may
condemn their own people to wars of aggression and expansion. It follows
then, that only liberal-democratic states should have a right to pre-emption
because only they are subject to the mechanisms of accountability that
ensure that this powerful right is exercised responsibly. This distinction
between pre-modern and post-modem, democratic and non-democratic
states resembles in important ways the distinctions made in nineteenth-
century international law between civilized states, which were members of
the family of nations and enjoyed the comprehensive rights of sovereignty,
and uncivilized states that were excluded from the family of nations and
were only partially sovereign at best. 9
Contemporary international law, however, has abolished the
distinction between civilized and uncivilized states. And while the
international community values democracy and has sought in various ways
to promote it, the alleged distinction between democratic states and non-
democratic states is not recognized in international law. Furthermore, of
course, there is a problem, which was evident in the nineteenth century, of
how these distinctions are to be made and applied. Nineteenth-century
international lawyers found it difficult to distinguish between civilized and
non-civilized states, and distinguishing between democratic and non-
democratic states could prove to be equally problematic.
Given the threats that pre-emption presents to the international
system-and all the ways in which pre-emption can disadvantage third-
world states, which will be the inevitable object of the exercise of the
doctrine-it is hardly surprising that the vast majority of third-world states
have responded to the threats made by the United States to attack pre-
18 For an examination of the implications of Kant's system to international law, see Anne-Marie
Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States" (1995) 6 E.J.I.L. 504.
19 See Antony Anghie, "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth
Century International Law" (1999) 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1.
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emptively when necessary.
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) stated:
The Heads of State or Government rejected the use, or the threat of the use of armed forces
against any NAM country under the pretext of combating terrorism, and rejected all attempts
by certain countries to use the issue of combating terrorism as a pretext to pursue their
political aims against non-aligned and other developing countries and underscored the need
to exercise solidarity with those affected. They affirmed the pivotal role of the United
Nations in the international campaign against terrorism. They totally rejected the term "axis
of evil" voiced by a certain State to target other countries under the pretext of combating
terrorism, as well as its unilateral preparation of lists accusing countries of allegedly
supporting terrorism, which are inconsistent with international law and the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter. These actions constitute, on their part, a form of
psychological and political terrorism.2'
This emphasis on the use of the UN in the War on Terrorism is
reiterated by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, which asserted that "[t]he fight
against terrorism should be conducted in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and other established
norms of international law."2
Powerful states have almost invariably attempted to expand the
circumstances in which they may use force.22 The Bush doctrine of pre-
emption, then, represents yet another attempt to do so in the context of the
new realities of terrorism. Even as it is vital to examine the elements of this
doctrine and the attempts to establish it as a part of international law, what
is equally important is the attempt to understand its impact on the Third
World, and the different legal, conceptual, and political mechanisms by
which the Third World will be both excluded from the doctrine, and
become the subject of its application and elaboration. My argument up to
now has been that even while the United States has been seeking to expand
its own authority, this development must also be seen in context of the
arguments that might be made to diminish the rights of third-world states,
those who would be excluded from the new right of pre-emption.
These debates cannot be seen in isolation from the major threat
that the West perceives from terrorism and, more particularly, the threat
of WMD and their use by terrorists. The right to self-defence is so
fundamental that it precedes all law. According to the sixteenth-century
2 0 Final Document, XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non Aligned Movement
Held 24-25 February 2003, online: <http://www.nam.gov.za/media/030227e.htm> at para. 119.
21 "China's Position Paper against International Terrorism," online: Permanent Mission of the
People's Republic of China in the UN <http://un.fmprc.gov.cn.eng/18635.html>.
22 For the attempts of the U.S. in this respect, see Marcelo G. Kohen, "The use of force by the
United States after the end of the Cold War, and its impact on international law," in Michael Byers &
Georg Nolte, eds., supra note 15, 197.
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jurist, Francisco de Vitoria: "In war everything is lawful which the defense
of the common weal requires. This is notorious, for the end and aim of war
is the defense and preservation of the State."23 Seen in this way, not only is
self-defence fundamental but whatever self-defence requires is legal. The
primordial and foundational significance of self-defence is suggested not
only by the work of earlier jurists,24 but also by the fact that the UN Charter
itself refers to self-defence as an "inherent right." It is a right, then, that
precedes the Charter. However, significantly, as discussed, the Charter limits
the exercise of self-defence to situations where a state has suffered an
armed attack.
Of course, the right of self-defence necessarily implies the right of
a state to arm itself. And strong arguments might be made that, given the
capabilities of modern weaponry, and the fact that certain states already
possess nuclear weapons, that nuclear weapons---or other WMD-are
essential for the defence of a state. Thus it is not difficult to understand why
so many states are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons, whatever the
effects such a pursuit may have on international stability. Indeed, ironically,
the alacrity with which the United States attacked Iraq, which was
suspected of having WMD but not, as yet, actual nuclear weapons, when
contrasted with the cautious U.S. approach towards North Korea, which is
suspected of having nuclear weapons, may suggest that the acquisition or
development of nuclear weapons is essential for the deterrence of the
United States.
Non-proliferation, then, is a major issue confronting the
international community. Yet here too, the asymmetries between the
nuclear powers and the Third World become evident. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty,25 which has been the most important mechanism for preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, has, with some justification, been criticized as
establishing a system of nuclear apartheid; it essentially permits established
nuclear states to maintain their weapons, 26 while preventing non-nuclear
states from developing a nuclear armory. Given the constraints imposed on
non-nuclear states, it is understandable that the treaty includes a provision
23 Francisco de Vitoria, De Indis et de lyre Belli Relectiones, ed. by Ernest Nys, trans. by John
Pawley Bate (New York: Oceana, 1917) at 171 [Vitoria].
24 See generally Rights of War and Peace, supra note 8.
25 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 1970, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [Non-
Proliferation Treaty].
26 Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, ibid., requires states to negotiate in good faith to
cease the nuclear arms race, and to negotiate a treaty "on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control." Such a treaty does not seem an immediate prospect.
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within it that entitles states to withdraw from it.27 The debate surrounding
non-proliferation has now acquired a very different complexion as a
consequence of the fact that the danger being confronted is not a nuclear
war between the Communist and Western world, but the possibility of
terrorists acquiring and using nuclear or other WMD.
Nuclear weapons have the potential to cause catastrophic and
irremediable damage. It is surely sensible, then, to promote effective and
global nuclear disarmament, the abolition of all nuclear weapons. It is in
this context that the General Assembly and the World Health Organization
(WHO) attempted to clarify the legal issues surrounding the possible use of
Nuclear Weapons by requesting an Advisory Opinion from the
International Court of Justice (IcJ) regarding the legality of the use, or the
threat of the use, of nuclear weapons.28 What is ironic about that case in the
light of current circumstances, however, is that it was the U.S. and the
United Kingdom WHO argued most vehemently, before the ICJ, that it was
legal to use nuclear weapons in "self-defence." These arguments were so
persuasive that the Court held, as a result of the decisive vote of President
Mohammed Bedjaoui, that it could not definitively rule that the use of
nuclear weapons was illegal in all circumstances.29 Thus, it could be legal to
use nuclear weapons in self-defence in certain cases. Some of the minority
judges such as Judges Higgins30 and Schwebel 3 went further in asserting
that nuclear weapons could be used in self-defence in extraordinary
circumstances. Therefore, it seems entirely inconsistent and self-serving for
the United States to decree that states should not develop nuclear weapons
and WMD in a situation where the U.S. and other Western nuclear states
have vehemently asserted their own right to possess and use such weapons.
Indeed, there are reports that the Bush administration is intent on
developing new types of nuclear weapons even as it seeks to bring about
disarmament more generally. It is doubtless the privilege of powerful states
to act inconsistently, convinced of their own virtue and rectitude. However,
it is hardly likely that other states will be impervious to these
inconsistencies, particularly with regard to a matter as crucial as self-
defence. In that case, however, the doctrine of pre-emption may serve the
27 Ibid., art. X. North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty through this mechanism,
although it did not provide the three-months notice stipulated in the provision.
2 8 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226.
29 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner & David Wippman, International Law: Norms, Actors,
Process (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2002) at 518.
30 Supra note 28 at 583.
31 Ibid. at 311.
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purpose of warning other states that any attempt by them to arm
themselves could be interpreted by the U.S. as a threat which could then
result in the U.S. exercising its right of pre-emptive self-defence. Starkly
presented, pre-emption in effect purports to create a system whereby states
can arm themselves only if they are permitted to do so by the United States.
The recent example of Libya might provide one example of the sort of
world that the United States and the West would seek to achieve, one in
which only certain civilized states have an effective right of self-defence.
III. PRE-EMPTION AND IMPERIALISM
The National Security Strategy, however, does not focus only on pre-
emption, even though pre-emption is a crucial part of the whole structure.
Pre-emption is connected, on one hand, with the concept of "rogue
states"-the most prominent of which constitute the Axis of Evil.32 These
are the states that are most likely to be the subject of pre-emptive attack.
In addition, President Bush has made it clear, both in the National Security
Strategy and subsequent speeches, including his speech at the Republican
National Convention in 2004, that the most effective way to combat
terrorism is to transform rogue states into democratic ones. Thus the
National Security Strategy seeks to promote "moderate and modern
government, especially in the Muslim world to ensure that the conditions
and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any
nation."33
Iraq presents a concrete example, in all its complexities, of the
National Security Strategy in action. In strictly legal terms, the United States
has not as yet invoked or justified any of its actions by resorting to the
doctrine of pre-emption. The invasion of Iraq has been explained instead
as action taken pursuant to the Security Council decisions relating to Iraq.34
This argument has been resisted by many prominent international lawyers
32 See President George W. Bush, "State of the Union Speech: the Axis of Evil" in Micah L.Sifry
& Christopher Cerf, eds., The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Touchstone
Books, 2003) at 251.
33 Supra note 1 at part III.
34 But see also John Yoo, "International Law and the War in Iraq" (2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 563, who
suggests that anticipatory self-defence pre-emption provided an independent legal basis for the war
against Iraq. Many other scholars, even those appearing to favour pre-emption, carefully tie pre-
emption to Security Council resolutions: see e.g. William H. Taft IV & Todd F.Buchwald, "Pre-emption,
Iraq and International Law" (2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 557.
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who continue to argue that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was illegal."
Moreover, Secretary-General Annan himself recently asserted that the Iraq
war was illegal. Whatever the official rationale for the action, however, the
Bush administration's extraordinary and undeniable emphasis on the threat
posed by the alleged Iraqi WMD to American security makes it impossible
to exclude Iraq from any discussion on pre-emption.
The invasion of Iraq all too graphically illustrates the security
concerns and policies of the United States, and the many problems
associated with the Bush doctrine. For example, pre-emption must be based
on sound, if not overwhelming evidence, for it is only such a threshold that
could justify the extraordinary measure of the pre-emptive use of force. The
then-U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell purported to present such
overwhelming evidence when appearing before the UN and urging the
international community to join in and support the invasion of Iraq. But the
absence of WMD and the complete failure of intelligence suggest the many
problems associated with this policy, and the international credibility of the
United States has suffered considerably as a result of this failure. Quite
apart from that, the Iraq example raises the question: if pre-emption is now
a part of international law, what are the legal consequences of a pre-
emptive attack that is subsequently proved to be based on the invader
country's completely mistaken belief that it was being threatened?
The idea that dangerous states, particularly in the Middle East, can
be invaded and then liberated raises a complex set of issues. Apart from the
question of whether the intended transformations can be readily effected,
questions arise as to what sort of democracy this will be, and what roles
international law and institutions are supposed to play in bringing it about.
President Bush has consistently argued that the goal of the U.S. action in
the Iraq is to promote democracy and self-government in that country. In
his presentation to the UN General Assembly, in September 2003, President
Bush asserted:
The primary goal of our coalition in Iraq is self-government for the people of Iraq, reached
by orderly and democratic process. This process must unfold according to the needs of Iraqis,
neither hurried, nor delayed by the wishes of other parties. And the United Nations can
contribute greatly to the cause of Iraq self-government.36
35 Sixteeen prominent international law teachers in the U.K. asserted that the use of force by the
U.S. against Iraq, in the absence of Security Council authorization, was a violation of international law:
See Ulf Bernitz et al., Letter to the Editor, The Guardian (7 March 2003) 29.
36,"Speech to the United Nations General Assembly" (23 September 2003), online: White House
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html>. The escalating violence in Iraq
subsequently persuaded the U.S. administration to establish a program for a swifter transfer of power.
Disengagement with Terrorism
President Bush, at least at that stage, forcefully opposed any
attempts on the part of the UN to quickly transfer power to the Iraqi people.
However, the deteriorating security situation caused the United States to
change this policy and to accelerate the transfer of power, asking for the
support of the UN in enabling this to occur. Thus, in June 2004, the Security
Council, acting under its Chapter VII powers, stated that it
Welcome[d] that ... by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional
Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty
Reaffirm[ed] the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and
to exercise full authority and control over their financial and natural resources.37
Thus, the sovereignty of Iraq has been restored, at least in legal
terms. The resolution also calls for international financial assistance to be
given to Iraq in terms of forgiveness of its sovereign debt.38 The resolution
also provides for arrangements regarding a security partnership between
Iraq and the "multinational force" that essentially consisted of the United
States and its allies in Iraq. The task of promoting democracy and
transforming the Middle East remains, however, largely incomplete and
problematic.
This, of course, is the second occasion on which Western powers
have attempted to promote self-government in Iraq. Iraq had been placed
under the trusteeship of Britain as a mandate of the League of Nations.
The Mandate system had been inspired by President Woodrow Wilson of
the United States who successfully opposed the attempts of the European
powers to colonize the territories that had previously belonged to the
defeated powers of Germany and Turkey.39 The purpose of the Mandate
system was to promote the "well-being and development" of the peoples of
the mandate territories.' The various mandate territories-which had been
previously under the sovereignty of the Ottoman and German Empires that
had been defeated in the Great War-were divided into three categories,
A, B, and c, based on their degree of "civilization." Iraq was regarded as
belonging to the most advanced class of territories, those that had "reached
a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can
be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative
3 7 Resolution 1546, SCOR, 2004, S/RES/1546 (2004).
3 8 Ibid., para. 28.
39 See Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (New York: Greenwood Press, 1930)
at 24-25 [Wright].
4 0 League of Nations Covenant, art. 22 [Covenant].
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advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to
stand alone., 41 The precise legal status of Iraq posed ongoing problems to
the League. On the one hand, Iraq was supposedly a mandate territory, but
the Iraqis themselves were not particularly happy with the prospect of being
ruled by the British, albeit as representatives of the League. Iraqi
discontent with British rule finally culminated in an uprising that began in
1920 and continued for several years, and led to punitive action being taken
against the local populations. 42 In time, these measures included the use of
poison gas and aerial bombardment, this at the instigation of Winston
Churchill.43
The oil resources of Iraq were a continuous preoccupation of the
British administrators. Complicated negotiations took place between
Britain and the United States on the exploitation of the oil fields; Wilson
had been insistent on the application of the "open door" policy to all the
mandate territories, and U.S. access to the oil fields of Iraq was to occur
through this mechanism.44 Instability in Iraq, the colonial administrators
recognized, would prevent any access to the oilfields. Sir Arthur Hirtzel of
the India Office, drawing upon considerable colonial experience, and
mindful of the need to placate public opinion in England, advised that
[w]hat we want to have in existence, what we ought to have been creating in this time, is some
administration with Arab institutions which we can safely leave while pulling the strings
ourselves; something that won't cost very much, which Labour can swallow consistent with
its principles, but under which our economic and political interests will be secure.45
In keeping with this policy, the British then proceeded to appoint
Faisal Ibn Hussein, whose family was famous throughout the Arab world,
and who had previously been ruler of Syria, as King of Iraq. Great care was
taken to create the appearance that Faisal had been elected by the people.46
King Faisal was faced with the daunting task of appearing to be,
simultaneously, both an Arab nationalist and responsive to British interests.
Faisal was not willing to acquiesce, however, to all the British demands.
Confronted with numerous pressures, Faisal finally entered into a
41 Ibid.
42 Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932 (London: Ithaca Press, 1976) at 40-41 [Sluglett].
43 Ibid. at 263ff.
44 Wright, supra note 39 at 60.
45 Cited in Sluglett, supra note 42 at 37.
4 6 Ibid. at 67-68. The British had arranged for the disappearance of a major rival candidate, Saiyid
Talib.
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treaty with the British in 1922. 4" The treaty dealt with matters ranging from
British supervision of the judicial system necessary to protect the interests
of foreigners, to financial and military matters: Britain, for instance,
undertook to provide "such support and assistance to the armed forces of
his Majesty the King of Irak as may from time to time be agreed by the
High Contracting Parties." This arrangement was presented as a
mechanism by which Britain could fulfil its obligations under the
Mandate.48 The mandate territories in general raised difficult problems in
relation to where sovereignty over the mandate territory was to be located.
But the situation in Iraq and the Anglo-Iraki treaty generated particularly
difficult and unresolved questions because of the complex issue of how
sovereignty in Iraq was divided among the three central parties: King
Faisal, who, after all, had been declared the proper sovereign King of Irak;
Britain, still nominally the mandatory power; and the League itself.49 While
the treaty provisions continuously reaffirmed the sovereignty of Iraq, the
British were to "provide the State of Irak with such advice and assistance
as may be required during the period of the present treaty, without
prejudice to her national sovereignty."5
Britain nevertheless proceeded to assume control, through the
treaty over most of the issues central to Iraq's sovereignty, including
financial and military affairs and indeed, the constitution of Iraq itself. The
treaty required the King of Irak to "frame an Organic Law for Presentation
to the Constituent Assembly"51; the basic character of that law was
stipulated by the treaty, and was to include provisions ensuring freedom of
worship and prohibiting discrimination. Significantly, it was expressly
provided that the organic law "shall contain nothing contrary to the
provisions of the present treaty. Legal complexities notwithstanding, the
reality, however, was that Faisal was heavily dependent on British support.
American oil companies had acquired interests in various oil developments
in Baghdad and Mosul in 1925. 53
Even this very brief sketch of the history of the relationship between
Iraq and the West suggests several reasons why Iraqis, fearful of terrorists
47 See Treaty Between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Irak, 10 October 1992 in
Wright, supra note 39 at 595-600 [Irak Treaty].
48 Wright, ibid. at 60-61.
49 Ibid. at 330.
50 Irak Treaty, supra note 47, art. 2.
51 Ibid., art. 3.
52 Ibid.
53 Wright, supra note 39 at 61.
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and insurgents, may also be suspicious of Western proclamations of concern
for the well-being and advancement of the Iraqi people. Several of the same
concerns and issues that arose in the 1920s have curiously re-emerged. And
it is unhelpful that many important economic decisions were made by the
American occupying authority well before any democratic government has
been established in Iraq. For instance, as The Economist notes in an article
blithely entitled "Let's all go to the yard sale," all Iraqi industries, except for
the oil industry, have been privatized 4.5 This is only one aspect of far-
reaching changes that have already been made to Iraq that could result in
Iraq becoming economically dependent on various external forces. Political
independence and democracy will lack real substance unless Iraqis can
hope to exert real control over their economy. Iraqi sovereignty has,
however, already been undermined by the widespread changes instituted by
the Coalition Provisional Authority, which have been "widely criticized for
being thinly veiled plans to give multinational corporations access to Iraqi
assets.''55 This is not the first time, then, that a major Western power,
vehemently proclaiming its concern for the well-being of the Iraqi people,
has attempted to establish a new system of government for Iraq while also
making various arrangements for the management of the oil resources of
the country. The granting of formal sovereignty to the people of Iraq is not
incompatible with continuing Western control of the country. This attempt
by the West to control an ostensibly sovereign Iraq occurred once before,
during the League period, and, given the evidence emerging from the
United States occupation of Iraq, is being attempted again. Only time will
reveal whether a truly independent and democratic Iraq will emerge from
these difficult circumstances.
IV. PRE-EMPTION AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION
Terrorism on the scale indicated by the tragedy of 9/11, it is argued,
is an unprecedented phenomenon, and a new type of international law and
new doctrines are required to address these new threats. The international
community thus is confronted with a "constitutional moment" or a
"transitional moment." Indeed, the Bush doctrine and the War Against
Terror in general have resulted in significant challenges to the existing law,
(27 September 2003) 44.
For a searching examination of the changes made to the Iraqi economy and the applicable law
after the occupation began, see James Thuo Gathii, "Foreign and Economic Right Upon Conquest and
Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context" 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 491 at 540
[Gathii]. (See especially ibid. at 536-39).
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not only of force, but human rights and international humanitarian law.56
Novel situations require novel remedies. My basic argument here is that the
Bush doctrine-which consists basically of pre-emption, the identification
and then transformation of rogue states-is essentially imperial in
character. It is yet another version of the civilizing mission that, I have
argued, has animated the international system from its very beginnings.
The basic structures of this argument are evident in the writings of
the sixteenth-century Spanish jurist, Francisco de Vitoria. Vitoria's work,
"On the Indians Lately Discovered," takes the form of an inquiry into the
manner in which the Spanish acquired sovereignty over the Indians of the
Americas. 7 What is especially striking about Vitoria's work is his careful
elaboration of the relationship between humanitarianism, intervention, war,
and transformation. Unlike many of his contemporaries, who characterized
the Indians as animals and less than human, Vitoria argued for the human
character of the Indians. However, it was precisely because they were
human, and therefore possessed the universal characteristic of reason that
they were bound by a universal natural law. This natural law, on closer
inspection, corresponds with idealized Spanish forms of behaviour. The
problem was that although the Indian had the inherent capacity to reason,
and therefore to enter the realm of the universal, the actual social,
historical Indian who had developed certain forms of government and other
social institutions, was nevertheless imprisoned in "the particular." The task
of the Spanish, the administrators of universal natural law, was to transform
the Indians and liberate them in such a manner as to enable them to enter
the realm of the universal. This was essentially to be achieved by waging
war on them.
Most significantly, the "natural law" enunciated by Vitoria includes
the right to travel and trade. Indeed, these rights are of such importance
that "to keep certain people out of the city or province as being enemies,
or to expel them when they are already there, are acts of war., 58 As a
consequence of this, any Indian resistance to Spanish incursions amount to
an act of war which can then give rise to self-defence. Once the Indians
violate the universal natural laws that give the Spanish the right to occupy
Indian lands, the Spanish
can make war on the Indians, no longer as on innocent folk, but as against forsworn enemies,
and may enforce against them all the rights of war, despoiling them of their goods, reducing
them to captivity, deposing their former lords and setting up new ones, yet withal with
56 See e.g. Vaughan Lowe, "The Iraq Crisis: What Now?" (2003) 52 I.C.L.Q. 859.
5 7 Supra note 23.
58 Ibid. at 151.
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observance of proportion as regards the nature of the circumstances and of the wrongs done
to them.
5 9
It is clear that the war waged by the Spanish against the Indians has
a special character, a range and intensity that would not occur in wars
between European states. War against the Indians was "perpetual and ...
they can never make amends for the wrongs and damages they have
wrought."6° Furthermore, in the case of the unbelievers, "it is useless to
hope for a just peace on any terms. And as the only remedy is to destroy all
of them who can bear arms against us, [p]rovided they have already been in
fault., 61 Given the fact that any Indian resistance to the Spanish incurs
"fault," war against the Indians becomes endless, and nothing short of the
complete subjugation of the Indians can ensure the safety of the Spanish.
One of the more interesting aspects of Vitoria's work is his
contrasting characterization of the Indians. On the one hand, the Indian is
formidably dangerous. On the other, the Indian must be liberated, and
Spanish sovereignty over the Indians can be founded on "the tyranny of
those who bear rule among the aborigines of America or on the tyrannical
laws which work wrong to the innocent folk there., 6' As we see here,
competing justifications for the conquest of the Indians exist: one based on
war as self-defence, and the other on humanitarian intervention. It is not
difficult, of course, to discern the resemblances between Vitoria's
justification for war on the Indians and President Bush's varying
justifications for attacking Iraq-where Iraq has not purported to attack the
United States. President Bush's further claim, that freedom is a gift that
God has given to all people, including Iraqis, and that it is the task of the
United States to make this gift a reality-thereby making the United States
the agent of God-also replicates Vitoria's argument that the Indians are
human, but it is only through the intervention of the Spanish that this
humanity can be realized. In the doctrine's more secular form, President
Bush relies on international human rights law to justify this whole exercise:
international human rights norms represent the "universal" into which the
Iraqis must be transformed through the cleansing mechanism of U.S.
intervention.
"Just war" doctrine is a major aspect of Vitoria's argument, and he
raises the question of whether subjective belief in the justness of a war
59 Ibid. at 155.
60 Ibid. at 181.
61 Ibid. at 183.
62 Ibid.
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makes it truly just because "were it otherwise, even Turks and Saracens
might wage just wars against Christians, for they think they are thus
rendering God service., 6 3 Crucially, then, just war cannot be defined in a
manner that would enable the non-Christian to engage in ajust war; pagans
are inherently incapable of engaging in a just war. And when we examine
pre-emption doctrine, we might see a similar structure of ideas emerging
once again: that is, the right of self-defence is posited as a fundamental
right that precedes international law. Yet, when this right is extended to
include pre-emptive self-defence, the right in question is to be limited to the
United States and its allies, much as the right to wage "just war" is
restricted to Christian states.
The war in Iraq, then, replicates many of these ancient structures
of ideas that link together trade, human rights, intervention, and liberation.
The U.S. has been intent on acquiring interests in the Middle Eastern
oilfields since at least the League period. And since that time, the U.S. has
asserted an absolute right to maintain those interests, intervening when
necessary in the political affairs of states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.
The right to trade asserted by Vitoria is an absolute right, and any violation
of this right is a cause for war. What is also illuminating about Vitoria's
arguments is his deployment of what we might term "humanitarian" or
"human rights" arguments for imperial purposes. The effectiveness of the
Bush strategy of using human rights to justify the invasion of Iraq is
suggested by the number of human rights advocates who supported the US
actions as a result.64 Whatever these resemblances, however, it is equally
clear that the whole imperial project, as articulated by the Bush
administration, has taken on a new urgency because the transformation of
the world is connected to self-defence. Thus, the whole discourse of human
rights now become connected to this larger goal. As President Bush has put
it:
Our security is not merely founded in spheres of influence, or some balance of power. The
security of the world is found in advancing the rights of mankind.
These rights are advancing across the world-and across the world, the enemies of human
rights are responding with violence. Terrorists and their allies believe the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the American Bill of Rights, and every charter of liberty
ever written, are lies, to be burned and destroyed.
65
63 Ibid. at 173.
64 See Jose E. Alvarez, "The Closing of the American Mind" in Proceedings of the 32d Meeting of
the Canadian Council of International Law. Held 14-16 October2004 (Canadian Council of International
Law, 2004).
65 President George W. Bush, "Address to the United Nations General Assembly" (21 September
2004), online: White House <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040921-3.html>.
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Terrorists undoubtedly pose an enormous threat to human rights.
But human rights advocates and scholars must surely be wary of a version
of human rights that is profoundly shaped by the security interests of the
United States. What this and the Iraq example suggest is that human rights
have been transformed into a vehicle of imperialism. Thus, it is not only the
law relating to the use of force, but also international human rights law that
may be transformed by the Bush doctrine: imperialism presents itself as
self-defence.
V. CONCLUSION
The international system has suffered a number of traumas since
9/11, and it is perhaps too early to assess the lasting impact of these events
on international law and organization. Clearly, however, the doctrine of
pre-emption and the war in Iraq suggest some of the major issues that must
be addressed. Proponents of the U.S. position on pre-emption have
forcefully argued that if the UN itself does not adapt to meet new realities
of terrorism and, in effect, institutionalize and support the U.S. position on
the use of force, then the UN would render itself irrelevant and "go the way
of the League of Nations. ,66 Indeed, some have gone further and argued
that pre-emption and all it involves in fact advances the causes that the
United Nations is concerned about.6 7
For scholars interested in the relationship between the Third World
and international law, what is evident is the resemblance between the new
initiatives that are being proposed by the pre-emption doctrine and much
earlier imperial themes. A UN that is transformed to accommodate pre-
emption doctrine will simply become a vehicle of this "new" imperialism, 68
and third-world countries have not been slow to recognize this reality. All
this will have serious consequences for the legitimacy of the UN-and this
at a time when the UN is arguably more important than ever because the
international community must respond to the threats posed by terrorism.
These threats can only be addressed on a multilateral basis. Many third-
world states suffered terrorist attacks, long before 9/11, and are seeking to
address the dangers of terrorism in concert with other nations. But the U.S.
approach has divided the international community that had previously been
far more unified with regard to this issue. It seems unlikely that the Bush
66 Charles Hill, "The Bush Administration Doctrine of Pre-emption" in Proceedings of the 98th
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law. Conference Held 31 March-4 April 2004
(American Society of International Law, 2004) at 331.
67 Sofaer, supra note 5 at 225.
68 See Jose Alvarez, "Hegemonic International Law Revisited" (2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 873.
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doctrine of pre-emption will subside, for pre-emption now has become an
issue that will remain on the international agenda. It is notable, for
example, that Prime Minister Howard of Australia has also formulated a
version of pre-emption that has now apparently become a part of
Australian policy.
The argument that all these developments represent an attempt to
reinstate an imperial order and are therefore against all the principles of
modern international law-the law of the UN that was developed in part to
negate the old imperial international law of the nineteenth century-is not
in itself decisive. For what we now face is the argument made by influential
academics and diplomats such as Niall Ferguson and Robert Cooper, that
what this disorderly and unstable world requires is in fact a return to an
imperial system. This imperialism, in the words of Cooper, is "a new kind
of imperialism, one acceptable to human rights and cosmopolitan values."69
This statement in itself suggests that human rights law is compatible with
imperialism rather than somehow inherently opposed to it. But more than
that, these arguments assume that imperialism in its most explicit forms,
can be a viable and sustainable policy in the twenty-first century. The U.S.
forces were touted to be the most powerful that have existed in the history
of the world, but the difficulties that the Unites States and its allies are now
confronting in Iraq may give pause to the assumption that imperial will can
simply assert itself and rule the world. Gone are the simpler and happier
days when the rioting natives could be quelled with a combination of British
pluck and a Gatling gun. Instead, we have a globalized world in which
suicide bombings and various new technologies have multiplied the ways of
causing massive destruction, and the battlefield extends well beyond the
peripheral territory to the very heart of the imperial centre. The costs and
risks of this modern imperialism are very great. In addition, imperialism
inevitably distorts the internal politics of the imperial power. Surely the lack
of accountability and transparency that have marked the Bush and Blair
administrations, despite the massive mistakes they made in the lead up to
and conduct of the Iraq war, suggest this possibility. At this point in time,
the war appears to have undermined democracy in the United States rather
than strengthened it in the Middle East.
Finally, third-world states and peoples, whatever the difficulties
they suffer from, are not likely to acquiesce readily to the return of explicit
imperialism. It is disconcerting that western attempts to create a new
international law should so unerringly return to the colonial origins of the
discipline. And the question remains open as to whether international law,
69 "The New Liberal Imperialism" The Observer (7 April 2002), online:
<http://observer.guardian.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,680095,00.html>
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an international law that has ostensibly repudiated the imperialism of the
past, will now resist these attempts to reinstate this new imperial order.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the UN released the
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.7" The
Report asserted, in effect, that while it may be legal for a state to act
unilaterally against an "imminent threat," it cannot so respond to a more
remote "emerging threat." In the case of such emerging threats, which give
rise to what the Report terms "preventive military action," it is the Security
Council that should decide the matter. In two of the most crucial
paragraphs addressing these issues, the Report states:
190.... if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence to
support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize such action
if it chooses to. If it does not so choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other
strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment-and to visit again
the military option.
191. For those impatient with such a response the answer must be that, in a world full of
perceived potential threats, the risk to the global order and the norm of non-intervention on
which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive
action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act
is to allow all.
7
1
While the Report reaffirms the continuing validity of the UN Charter,
it remains to be seen whether this response will be persuasive to states that
are skeptical about the effectiveness of the UN Charter and the role of the
Security Council in maintaining international peace.
70,,A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change, UN GAOR, 2004, UN Doc. A/59/565, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/secureworld/>.
71 ]bid. at 55.
